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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Valley has skirted many of the arguments in Sine's 
opening brief. Its philosophy appears to be one of ignoring the 
lower court's errors, since it feels entitled to win and did. To 
argue that "all's well that ends well" does not work in this 
case. Valley cannot, under law or equity, agree to bid the full 
debt, extract a promise that Sine would not attend the sale, 
arbitrarily bid in a lower amount and then be awarded judgment 
for the $340,000 difference. 
Valley had the right to pursue Sine directly. But by 
electing to dispose of the collateral by sheriff sale, Valley 
subjected itself to the statutory requirements for seeking a 
deficiency. 
ARGUMENT 
1. A trial is needed to determine the facts. Valley's 
listing of facts is revealing. Br. pp. 6-7. Paragraphs 15 
through 18 decry a need for evidence on various issues. 
Paragraph 19 sets forth the following facts relating to the Se 
Rancho Motel which are admittedly "not in the record": 
a. that redemptive rights were granted to Sines, 
b. that those rights were not exercised, 
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c. that Valley has attempted to sell the motel, 
d. that those sales efforts have not succeeded, 
e. that Valley is leasing the motel to Sines. 
Valley must feel these are material to the appeal or they would 
not have been set forth in its brief. If there are facts not in 
the record which the moving party feels are material, one must 
question whether that party should have been awarded summary 
judgment. 
Paragraph 20 of the response brief begrudgingly concedes 
that Valley has admitted that it "agreed to do certain things." 
Br. p. 7. Of course those "things" are to bid in the amount of 
the debt, costs and attorney fees. Without skipping a beat, 
Valley then "disagrees with the statements" in the affidavits of 
Sine and Cundick. Appendix IV to opening brief. Valley then, 
without specifics, accuses Sine of mischaracterizing its own 
affidavits. Even though Valley says for purposes of the appeal 
that it "agreed" to stay away from the sale, Br. p. 7., Sine is 
punished repeatedly by Valley for precisely the same terminology. 
Br. pp. 7, 8, 15, 17, 18 and 23. 
Clearly the record lacks necessary richness. Trial is 
necessary to determine the various issues. This problem is 
underlined by the fact Valley failed to respond to Sine's point # 
4, "Trial is needed to determine the nature of the new oral 
agreement." So in addition to legal error, factual issues 
prevent summary judgment. 
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Valley has rightly invited the Court to "determine 
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Br. p. 
10. 
2. Valley essentially admits lower court error. For 
example, it states, "Though the language of the Summary Decision 
is somewhat ambiguous, the district court did not make a specific 
finding that Valley's statement constituted an agreement." 
Posing this problem points again to the need for trial and 
fact-finding. Valley calls the Summary Decision "ambiguous", and 
feels the need to torture its wording to support its victory. 
The decision is Appendix II of Sine's opening brief and Addendum 
A to Valley's response. Valley drafted no further written 
decision for the court to consider—only a judgment. 
Then comes the following charge: "Valley argues that to 
the extent the district court implied the existence of an oral 
agreement as the basis for its ruling, such implication is 
unfounded and erroneous." Br. p. 11. If both parties find 
error, reversal is warranted. And a trial is needed if Valley 
itself is unsure whether the lower court based its decision on 
existence of an agreement. Finally, Valley failed to cross 
appeal and raise its point of error. 
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3. A deficiency is barred by the plain language of S 
57-1-32, Otah Code, Despite lack of authority to support its 
position, Valley states that the statute does not apply to 
enforcement of a guarantee. Br. pp. 13-15. 
Valley's nonresponsiveness to Sine's arguments is 
especially noticeable on the subject of its failure to comply 
with this statute. The following points are included in Sine's 
brief (pp. 7-12), but remain unrebutted for the most part: 
10. The judgment is invalid for failure to 
comply with S 57-1-32. 
11. The plain language of § 57-1-32 is broad 
and without exception. 
12. It would be unfair and contrary to S 
57-1-32 to allow a deficiency judgment under these 
circumstances. 
Valley fails to directly refute these points, but seems 
to ask the Court to look past the plain language of the statute. 
§ 57-1-32 provides as follows: 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as hereinafter 
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust 
deed was given as security, and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, 
the amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering the judgment, the court shall find 
the fair market value at the date of sale of the 
property sold. The court may not render judgment 
for more than the amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness with interest, costs and expenses of 
sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of 
the date of the sale. . . . 
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§ 57-1-32, Utah Code (1986) (emphasis altered from original). 
The highlighted portions are those which were not complied with 
by Valley and the lower court. The complaint was brought too 
soon, it lacked the required allegations and the court did not 
make the required findings. 
"[T3he plain language of the statute [is that] . . . if 
the beneficiary of a trust deed elects to foreclose non-
judicially, is owed a deficiency following application of the 
sale proceeds, and wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment," the 
statutory procedure must be followed "or any claim to a 
deficiency is waived." G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Durbano, 
121 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1989). Valley waived 
its deficiency, since more than three months have passed since 
the sale and a proper deficiency action has not been brought. 
The statute does not in any way limit its effect to a 
deficiency lawsuit against the principal debtor. It applies to 
"any sale of property under a trust deed" as provided in the 
statutes on trust deed foreclosure. § 57-1-32, Utah Code 
(1986). Valley's nonjudicial sheriff sale must have been by 
authority of those provisions, or it was without any authority 
at all. 
If such a sale occurs, a deficiency is allowed only as 
provided in § 57-1-32, Utah Code. Valley is not required to 
comply with that statute. It must comply, though, if it chooses 
to foreclose independently and deny the debtors the protection 
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of the courts. " [Slection 57-1-32 provides the exclusive 
procedure for securing a deficiency judgment following a 
trustee's sale of the real property under a trust deed." Cox v. 
Green, 696 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1985). 
The statute does not differentiate between principal 
debtors and guarantors. Valley reads the difference into it, 
despite the clear wording. Valley's observation that Sine was 
not the maker of the note or the giver of security is of no 
significance under the wording of the statute. 
Statutory terms are used advisedly, and should be given 
an interpretation and application which is in accord with their 
usually accepted meaning. Board of Educ. of Granite School 
Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). Literal 
wording controls the interpretation. Cox Rock Products v. 
Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672 Utah App. 1988; Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, Cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah App. 1988). "Plain meaning" will not be 
ignored in favor of some effort to divine legislative intent. 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 245, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1988). 
4. Valley dodged the point on this issue. Its short 
treatment of § 57-1-32 depends entirely on the case of 
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1982). But that case is not on point. It merely makes the 
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obvious point that an unconditional guarantee of payment allows 
the creditor to proceed against the guarantor without exhausting 
its remedies against the principal. 646 P.2d at 743-744. But 
this is not the issue. 
The issue is whether, having elected to exhaust its self 
help remedies within the trust deed statute, Valley can ignore 
the applicable limitations and sue for a deficiency. Since a 
deficiency is only possible within the statute, the issue must 
be resolved in the negative. This issue is not treated even 
remotely by Strevell-Paterson. 
But that case does provide a helpful analogy, citing to 
FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), 
cited by Strevell-Paterson, 646 P.2d at 743. FMA construed § 
70A-9-504(3), the Uniform Commercial Code provision requiring 
creditors to give notice to the "debtor" in order to accomplish 
a commercially reasonable nonjudicial sale of collateral. 
"Debtor" was held to include a mere guarantor, and no deficiency 
was possible unless the guarantor was given reasonable notice of 
the sale. 590 P.2d at 807. Like the trust deed statute at 
issue here, the UCC provision litigated in FMA does not even 
mention guarantors. But they are included nevertheless. 
The purpose of the notice requirement is for the 
protection of the debtor [which includes the 
guarantor], by permitting him to bid at the sale, 
or arrange for interested parties to bid, and to 
otherwise assure that the sale is conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner. The danger 
resulting from not notifying the debtor of the sale 
of secured property is that the property may be 
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sold for an amount unreasonably below its market 
value, burdening the debtor with liability for the 
deficiency. 
FMA, 590 P.2d at 807 (bracketed portion added). The same "plain 
meaning" statutory construction applies. The same public 
policy—avoiding an absolute bidding power by the creditor, 
which would in turn produce an arbitrary deficiency judgment— 
applies to both statutes. In FMA the guarantor was not properly 
notified of the sale, so no judgment against him was possible. 
5. The affidavits establish an agreement for Valley to 
bid the full debt. Valley's point III contends to the contrary. 
Br. p. 15-16. But it really amounts to an argument for a trial 
to determine whether an agreement was formed. And as indicated 
above, Valley has admitted in connection with this promise that 
it "agreed to do certain things." Br. p. 7. 
According to Sine's affidavit, Valley's representative 
stated: "I need not worry that Valley Bank would bid on the 
property at the amount owed on the note plus interest, costs and 
attorney fees." Opening Br., Appendix IV 11 3, R. 057. He 
continues, "I was asked if I planned to attend the sale. 
Relying upon this assurance from Mr. Doctorman and Mr. Zollinger 
I told them I probably would not and did not. . . . " Id 11 4, R. 
058. 
Mr. Cundick's affidavit states, "in response to concerns 
raised by Mr. Sine, Mr. Doctorman represented that at the 
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sheriff's sale . . . Valley Bank would bid on the property at 
the amount owed, plus interest/ plus attorney fees." Id. at K 
5, R. 059. 
Valley merely argues semantics when it calls the 
assurance something other than an "agreement." A question on 
this issuef if relevant, would be for the fact finder to 
determine. A conflict as to the terms the parties intended to 
include in an agreement presents a factual question for the 
jury. Hays v. Underwood/ 411 P.2d 717/ 720-721/ 196 Kan. 265 
(1966). 
Valley's suggestion that this Court should view Valley's 
statement "in context" (Br. p. 16) is another invitation for a 
trial to determine the proper context. Valley may not ask this 
court/ and should not have asked the trial court on summary 
judgment/ to weigh the facts. 
Valley also asks this Court to delve into whether there 
was an offer/ acceptance and consideration. Br. pp. 16-17. 
This is still another factual inquiry that should have been made 
at trial. The affidavits indicate Valley offered to Sine that 
Valley would bid in the whole debt (thereby extinguishing it). 
Sine both stated his acceptance/ and refrained from attendance 
or efforts to find bidders. 
Valley argues that there is a lack of is proper 
consideration/ despite the holding of the trial court that 
"there is consideration for the oral agreement in the form of 
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defendant's purported failure to attend or encourage others to 
attend the trustee's sale. . . . " Summary Decision, Opening Br. 
Appendix II, Response Br. Addendum A, p. 3, R. 090. The effort 
to make a controversy on this issue shows that a trial is needed 
to examine consideration and/or the lower court decision was 
ambiguous. Again, Valley failed to preserve its disagreement 
with the finding of consideration by cross-appealing. 
So consideration for the promise lies in the detriment to 
Valley of losing a deficiency right on the one hand, and a 
detriment to Sine in absenting himself from a sale he had the 
right to attend on the other. In response, Valley asserts that 
Sine could not have bid or found a bidder. Evidence in support 
of such an argument was not presented by affidavit and no trial 
was had to receive it. 
6. The agreement is not covered by the statute of 
frauds. Valley also fails to properly respond to Sine's 
arguments on this issue. Compare Opening Br. pp. 2, 7 with 
Response Br. pp. 19-20. Sine incorporates his arguments on this 
point by reference, as it is inappropriate to rehash them in a 
reply brief. Points 2, 3 and 9. 
Once again, for this point Valley relies exclusively on 
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1982). That case does not apply here either. It states that a 
release of a guarantee is covered by the statute of frauds. 646 
P.2d at 742. 
_ l n _ 
But here the unconditional open-ended guarantee was not 
released. It is true that the agreement to bid in the full debt 
extinguished the guaranteed debtf making judgment in this case 
impossible. But it does not change the nature of the guarantee. 
If Valley were to lend additional funds to Sine's parents, his 
guarantee would likely still be in effect. No one has argued 
that the guarantee itself was released. Valley has emphasized 
repeatedly that it is continuing in nature. But obviously Sine 
would be Valley's debtor only to the extent there remains a debt 
owing which may be guaranteed. 
Of course even if this agreement were otherwise covered 
by the statute of frauds, part performance, waiver and estoppel 
take it outside the statute. 
7. Part performance may be considered. One of the first 
arguments Valley makes is that the lower court made an error— 
that it was right to hold for Valley but may have done so on an 
incorrect basis. Br. p. 11. Valley urges that this Court may 
affirm the decision on a ground raised for the first time on 
appeal. Id. Yet later Valley asserts that the doctrine of part 
performance was not raised by Sine below and so may not be 
considered on appeal. Br. p. 20-22. 
This is an unusual case for Valley to complain that part 
performance was not raised in answer to its complaint for the 
following reasons, among others: 
a. The action was filed December 13, and a return of 
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service was filed December 29, 1989. R. 006. This is the same 
day Sine's performance (not attending the sheriff sale) 
occurred. Is it surprising part performance was not set forth 
in the answer as specifically as Valley would like? 
b. The complaint did not allege a statute of frauds 
issue, making it impossible to raise part performance as a 
defense in the answer. 
c. The answer does raise "settlement" and "accord 
and satisfaction" in its Third Defense. R. 009. This is 
sufficient notice pleading to raise the fact the parties agreed 
to extinguish the debt. 
Valley argues (Br. p. 24) that part performance may not 
be discussed here; that Valley's action is "at law" and part 
performance is "purely equitable in nature." Yet it is Valley 
who relies upon the statute of frauds to escape a promise it 
must have later regretted. Is Valley asserting that the statute 
of frauds can be raised in this case, but avoidance of it 
cannot? The statute of frauds itself states: "Nothing in this 
chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of 
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case 
of part performance thereof." § 25-5-8, Utah Code. 
The part performance exception is well recognized. 
Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981). In Baldwin 
v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984), both parties had 
admitted the existence of the oral contract, as they do in this 
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appeal. Some partial payments for the real estate involved. 
"This part performance was sufficient to remove the contract 
from the statute of frauds under these circumstances where the 
existence of the contract was admitted." 676 P.2d at 417. 
8. Part performance was timely raised. Valley states 
that Sine did not claim part performance in his response to 
Valley's summary judgment motion. Actually, the agreement to 
bid in the full debt was described. Defendant's Response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 11 3, R. 052. "In 
reliance upon that agreement defendant did not attend the 
trustee!']s sale, did not bid at that sale tor] make efforts to 
have others bid at that sale." Id. See also Sine and Cundick 
affidavits, attached to the Response. R. 057-060. Sine's 
performance, then, was fully described shortly after the 
performance occurred. Apparently Valley quibbles with failure 
to identify the doctrine by name. Not only is this unnecessary, 
but it would be absurd to expect it, since the statute of frauds 
defense was not even raised by Valley until later. 
The statute of frauds first became part of this case 
until Valley's reply memorandum. So Sine had no pleading in 
which to restate its part performance theory before summary 
judgment was issued. It was, however, specifically argued in 
Sine's Objection to Order, Motion for a New Trial or to Correct 
Decision and Memorandum of Authorities. R. 92-94. This motion 
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was filed within the ten days permitted by Rule 59(b), URCP. 
The motion was based in part on Rule 59(a)(7) (new trial 
permitted for error in law). Even the portion of Sine's 
document which objected to the order attacked its substance, not 
its form. So the five day limitation of Rule 4-504(2), Code of 
Judicial Administration does not apply. 
The important fact is that Sine described the part 
performance in his first memorandum and affidavit, then 
specifically labeled it as such in his next pleading: the motion 
for a new trial or to reconsider. The trial court had ample 
opportunity to consider the doctrine's applicability to the 
facts. The court had much more notice and opportunity to 
consider the facts and theory of part performance than was true 
in Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). A matter is sufficiently raised to 
preserve it for appeal if it has been submitted to the trial 
court, which has had an opportunity to consider it and rule upon 
it. See, James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987). 
Defendants also contend that the plaintiffs raise 
in their brief in this court for the first time 
matters which were not presented to the district 
court, and hence should not be considered here. 
The principle is correct. But its application here 
is not. Upon examination we find that, though the 
pleadings and submissions speak in generality, the 
critical matters recited above pertaining to the 
plaintiffs' claim of fraud were sufficiently set 
forth in the pleadings, affidavits and depositions. 
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Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976). 
9. Promissory estoppel was timely raised. Valley's 
argument to the contrary (point 8 above) misses the mark for the 
same reasons as its argument that part performance was not 
timely raised. Sine's arguments in response to that argument 
are incorporated herein. 
Valley admits estoppel was raised in Sine's answer, as 
its Second Defense. R. 009. In paragraph 3 of Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Sine sets 
forth Valley's assurance about bidding at the trustee's sale, 
and that Sine stayed away and refrained from seeking bidders 
n[i]n reliance upon that agreement." R. 052. The affidavits 
attached gave more detail on the promise and reliance. 
The Supplemental Affidavit of Wesley Sine (filed a month 
before the decision was rendered in this case) stated in part: 
As indicated in his prior affidavit herein. Affiant 
change[d] his position in a material and 
substantial way by not attending the trustee's sale 
and not attempting to obtain higher bidders at that 
sale in reliance upon plaintiff's assurances that 
plaintiff would be the full amount owed to 
plaintiff and that there would be no claim of a 
deficiency. Affiant believes that plaintiff is 
therefor estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds, 
lack of consideration, or other defenses to the 
enforceability of said oral agreement. 
R. 074, 11 2. A copy of the Supplemental Affidavit is attached 
hereto as Appendix I. 
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The Summary Decision of the court even acknowledges that 
one of the grounds for Sine!s opposition to summary judgment was 
that "plaintiff orally waived a claim for deficiency judgment 
and is thus estopped from proceeding against defendant." R. 
088, Appendix II, Opening Brief, Addendum A, Valley's Response 
Brief. The court went on to override the estoppel theory and 
invalidate the agreement under the statute of frauds, without 
explaining why estoppel did not apply. 
Finally, estoppel was argued again in the post judgment 
motion discussed above. R. 093, 11 3. How can Valley argue with 
a straight face that Sine "failed to raise the defense of 
promissory estoppel"? Br. p. 26-27. 
Valley argues that promissory estoppel cannot prevail 
because it is not convinced the promise to bid the full debt in 
fact caused Sine's reliance, and is not convinced Sine could 
have bid or found a bidder. Br. pp. 28-29. These are merely 
factual doubts, and are not arguments in support of dismissal on 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Valley is stuck with the plain meaning of the statute on 
deficiency judgments. Having made no effort to comply when it 
arbitrarily credit bid about $840,000, Valley will have to be 
satisfied with ownership of the motel. 
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Valley agreed or represented its bid would vitiate a 
deficiency judgment/ lulling Sine into complacency. The 
agreement was to wipe out the debt, not release the guarantee 
itself. So the statute of frauds does not apply. Even if it 
did. Valley cannot avoid its promise with impunity, since 
estoppel, waiver and part performance take it out of the statute 
of frauds. The decision should be reversed and/or remanded for 
trial. 
Respectfully so requested March 19, 1990. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 19, 1990 I caused to be 
hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, the original and 
seven copies of the foregoing to the office of the Clerk of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, and that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to also be served by postage prepaid 
mail or hand delivery to the following at the address indicated: 
Gary Doctorman, Esq. 
50 West Broadway 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX I 
Supplemental Affidavit of Wesley Sine 
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Ronald C. Barker #0208 
Attorney for defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
ooOoo 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESLEY SINE, 
Defendant* 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
WESLEY SINE 
Case No. C88-0907962CV 
Judge Michael Murphy 
ooOoo 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
County of Salt Lake) 
WESLEY SINE, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and 
says that he is the defendant in the above entitled action; that 
he has personal knowledge concerning each of the following state-
ments and is competent to testify with respect thereto except as 
otherwise noted: 
1. That Jerry Sine Investments is a general partnership 
whose partners are Jerry Sine and Dora Sine. Said partnership 
has existed for many years and has regularly filed partnership 
tax returns with the State of Utah and with the Internal Revenue 
Service. Plaintiff and its counsel are well aware of that partner-
ship since the same counsel for plaintiff herein also appeared as 
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counsel for Valley Bank & Trust Company in a Chapter 11 Bank-
ruptcy proceeding involving said partnership. 
2. As indicated in his prior affidavit herein, Affiant 
changes his position in a material and substantial way by not 
attending the trustee's sale and not attempting to obtain higher 
bidders at that sale in reliance upon plaintiff's assurances that 
plaintiff would bid the full amount owed to plaintiff and that 
there would be no claim of a deficiency. Affiant believes that 
plaintiff is therefore estopped to assert Statute of Frauds, lack 
of consideration, or other defenses to the enforceability of said 
oral agreement. 
Dated the 22*^ day of February, 19^9. 
Wesley P. Sine 7 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the^g? day ofTebruary , 1989. 
ires:j^4 
notary Public Residing at 
Sal t Lake Ci ty , TJtah 
My commission exp i s : (Xuay^ut j^/9?/ « 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, the j&Z^ day of February, 1989, to each 
of the following persons at the addresses indicated: 
Gary Doctorman, Esq. and Elizabeth S. Whitney, Esq., BIELE, 
HASLAM & HATCH, 50 West Broadway #400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101. 
3way-v*4UU, salt Lake city, utc 
Ronald C. Barker 
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